In January of 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021)
This case was the subject of a case review by U of O Law School Professor Andrea Coles-Bjerre in the Spring, 2021 Oregon State Bar Debtor/Creditor Subsection Newsletter. It is of great interest to us as Eugene, OR bankruptcy attorneys and debt relief lawyers because it involves the issue of whether you can get a repossessed vehicle back by quickly filing Chapter 13.
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the opinion but noted that the decision created a lack of procedures for a timely and cost-effective turnover to debtors, especially debtors seeking to recover their daily driving vehicle needed for an effective reorganization. She called this a “gap left by the court’s ruling today.”
In practice, this is a chasm with debtors facing extraordinary costs and delay in recovering a vehicle from a creditor who chooses to follow the Supreme Court’s safe harbor of “passive retention,” resulting in an increase of surrendered vehicles where the loans could have been restructured in a Chapter 13. This decision has also emboldened certain auto lenders to move vehicles to distant auction markets, making it even more difficult for a debtor to recover a vehicle. Locally, I have seen repossessed vehicles moved rapidly to Boise or Seattle for auction.
Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion was a direct plea to Congress and/or the Court to resolve the procedural problems the decision created. But before looking at such a response, let’s take a few minutes to review what happened after the Supreme Court’s ruling.
The case consolidated four separate Chapter 13 cases where the City of Chicago had seized a debtor’s vehicle to pay municipal obligations such as parking or traffic tickets. The Supreme Court reached a narrow ruling interpreting the stay under Section 362(a)(3) and the turnover provisions of Section 542(a). The Supreme Court did not address any other subsections of 362, and remanded the case back to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit evaluated the appeal record and determined that in two of the four cases, there were unresolved issues regarding potential stay violations of other subsections of 362. Therefore, it remanded those two cases, In Re Fulton and In Re Shannon back to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings. (City of Chicago v. Fulton, case no. 18-04116, nonprecedential disposition order dated April 12, 2021 (7th Cir. 2021))
Ultimately, these remands did not produce any decisions that would assist with the unanswered questions from Chicago v. Fulton.
In In Re Fulton, the Chapter 13 case had been dismissed for debtor’s failure to make Plan payments. The debtor, the City of Chicago and the trustee all agreed that there was no need to reopen the case to adjudicate potential stay violations and any related damages.
In In Re Shannon, the Chapter 13 Plan had been completed and the case was in final stages of closing. Again, the parties decided not to adjudicate any potential stay violations and related damages. The City had already surrendered the vehicle by Bankruptcy Court Order as a sanction. However, this case was somewhat unique in that there was no turnover motion but just a motion for Section 362(a) sanctions after Plan confirmation. In the approximately 40 published opinions citing Chicago v. Fulton, none have interpreted it with regard to the issues in the case. All of the written opinions cite it for other reasons.
Part of the gap identified by Justice Sotomayor was a rule-based gap in that FRBP 7001(1) requires an Adversary Proceeding “to recover money or property”. The Supreme Court’s decision was released on January 14, 2021 and, within 15 days, the legal profession had responded. On January 29, 2021, 45 law professors raised the issue to the U.S. Court’s Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. Their letter analyzed the issues and attached detailed proposed rule changes to create a new motion proceeding for turnover under Section 542. Their proposal was to create a national turnover procedure for use in all chapters by all debtors as to any property.
On February 4, 2021, three further law professors provided comment on these proposed rules and provided some minor revisions. Shortly thereafter, the National Bankruptcy Conference submitted its own comments that supported of the initial proposed rules by the 45 law professors and also provided some minor revisions.
At the May 24, 2021 meeting of the Committee, these proposals were discussed and the Committee agreed that the Consumer Subcommittee should further investigate the matter, including whether there should be an expansive rule change as proposed by the law professors or a more limited rule change. The Subcommittee would also survey Bankruptcy Courts and trustees because the Committee noted that some Bankruptcy Courts were already allowing turnover by motion.
The Subcommittee reported back and, on August 19, 2021, the Advisory Committee reached a final decision on a rule change to be published for comment. The Committee ultimately proposed a very narrow change to Rule 7001, differing substantially from the proposal by the law professors and the National Bankruptcy Conference.
The Committee felt that the rule change should focus on the issues in Chicago v. Fulton. The proposed rule would merely add a further exception to Rule 7001 that reads “a proceeding by an individual Debtor to recover tangible personal property under Section 542(a).” There is no discuss as to why “tangible personal property” was used instead of say “consumer property.” Nor did the Committee suggest how “tangible personal property” was defined. Thus, the Committee left it to local jurisdictions to craft rules for a turnover motion of tangible personal property by an individual Debtor.
The Subcommittee’s survey of Bankruptcy Courts and Trustees is somewhat interesting. It received responses from 45 clerks. 4 clerks responded that their districts, prior to Fulton, had local rules that allowed turnover of estate property by motion. Several other districts do not bar turnover motions but allow them to proceed as a motion if the respondent does not object. And 8 courts were in the process of considering rule revisions in response to Fulton.
The Trustees, perhaps providing overlapping responses, also reported that 4 courts allowed turnover by motion and 6 were considering rule changes to allow turnover by motion. And 3 commented that their courts have been allowing turnover by motion without a local rule that expressly provides for that procedure. So, it seems that the gap is closing fast and that motions under Section 542(a) for turnover will shortly be allowed in all jurisdictions.
However, neither the Supreme Court, the rules Committee nor the commentators’ proposed rules address turnover motions under Section 543, which is turnover by a custodian. Chicago v. Fulton was somewhat of an unusual case because all of the vehicles had been seized by the City and held by the City as creditor. But a far more common occurrence is an auto lender using a repossession agent to recover the collateral and to move it through the liquidation process. So, is there still a gap for the more common situation of a repossession agent in possession of a vehicle and with directions from the creditor to move the vehicle along to auction? Or can local court’s address Section 543 in conjunction with Section 542?
First, one must consider if a repo agent constitutes a custodian under Section 543. “Custodian” is defined at Section 101(11) and includes “a Trustee receiver, or agent under applicable law or under a contract that is appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property or for the purpose of general administration of such property for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors.”
A repo agent would constitute a classic state law agent acting on behalf of a lender under applicable state law and contract. The agent is taking charge of a debtor’s property for the purposes of enforcing a lien against such property. Therefore, repo agents are arguably custodians.
If that is the case, then there would be no bar to local court’s enacting rules for turnover by repo agents who remain in possession of a debtor’s vehicle at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed. This is because of significant differences between Section 543 and Section 542.
One issue courts have considered in looking at Section 362, Section 542 and Rule 7001, is that Section 542, while mandatory, contains conditions and exceptions that require an adversary proceeding. But those conditions and exceptions are not present in Section 543, which is equally mandatory. More importantly, Section 543 has some different conditions and exceptions that all requires a custodian to get a court order to be relieved of Section 543's mandatory provisions, after notice and a hearing. A court is also empowered, after notice and a hearing, to enter other orders of various types, including orders to protect the custodian who complies with the turnover obligations, to provide payment to the custodian for reasonable expenses and costs, and to surcharge the custodian for any improper behavior in administering the asset.
Therefore, one cannot conclude that Section 7001 prohibits a turnover motion against a custodian because Congress expressly authorized matters related to custodian turnover to be addressed by the court after notice and a hearing. This is similar language that justified the Oregon District Court adopting rules for lien stripping under Section 506 instead of an Adversary Proceeding under Rule 7001. Rule 7001 requires an Adversary Proceeding to “determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien” but Section 506 also allows the extent of a secured lien to be decided by motion. Since the Code supersedes the Rules and the code is clear that a court has authority to engage in motion practice under Section 543, all districts are free to proceed with Section 543 turnover motion rules.
Congress should give further thought regarding the Supreme Court’s decision and a growing safe harbor for “passive retention”. The ruling was not surprising in light of a similar ruling regarding cash collateral in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995) and various court decisions as to pre-petition ligation allowing a creditor to passively retain a case on a state court docket instead of actively dismissing the case.
Fulton is just a another instance of passive behavior that is a judicial exception to the stay. But passivity by a creditor can ripen into sanctionable behavior. A good example are cases were a debtor surrendered a relatively worthless vehicle. The creditor then refuses to recover its collateral yet refuses to surrender title to allow a debtor to dispose of the worthless collateral. This is a type of passive behavior. But the courts, starting with In Re Pratt, 462 F.3d 14 (First Cir. 2006), have found such passive behavior can be coercive and, therefore, a violation of the discharge injunction. Similarly, under Strumpf, the passive behavior, such as a freeze on a debtor’s accounts, can quickly degenerate into a stay violation.
But a bank or credit union can no longer wait out the case to discharge and then, with the stay lifted, exercise their offset rights by seizing the cash collateral. Nor can they wait months to seek relief from stay. To do so is a stay violation. In re Orr, 234 B.R. 249 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Wicks, 215 B.R. 316 (U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D.N.Y. 1997).
Of course, it is up to Congress to address whether such passive behavior should be treated as a stay violation by amending the Code.
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